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THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. HERBER'!' flALLNER,
Respondent.
[1] BribelT - Executive Officera.-Pen. Code, § 67, prohibiting
offering bribe to "executive officer of this state," includes
executive officer of a city.
[2&,2b] Id.-Executive Officera.-Word "of" may be used in its
possessive sense or to indicate geographic location, and as used
in Pen. Code, § 67, prohibiting offering bribe to "executive
officer of this state," includes an executive officer "in the
state," especially where a judicial construction to that effect
has not been altered by subsequent amendment of such code
section and is in harmony with other code sections pertaining
to bribery of public officers.
[3] Statutes-Construction - Presumptions - Legislative Knowledge.-Where a statute has been construed by judicial decision and such construction is not altered by subsequent
legislation, it is prf~sunll'd that Legislature is aware of such
judicial ('onSlt·lIl·tion and approves of it.
MeR:. Dig. References: [1,2] Bribery, § 6; [3] Statutes, § 184;
[4] Statutes, §lo7; [5] Statutes, 1122; [6, 7] Statutes, §37;
[8] Statutes, § 122-

I
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[4] Id.-Construction-With Reference to Othel Laws. --Lpg-isla.
tive intE'llt should be ascertained not alone from literal
nlpalling of words of statute but on cOII~idl'ration of nil law
relating to 51\1IH' ~uh.i(>rt matter.
[5] Id. - Construction - Effect of Con3tl'Uction. - Confltrnction
placed on statutI' hy highest court of stu te will be stl>adily
aahl'red to in sub~l'qnellt cases unless plainly shown to have
been wrong, especially where c(Hli'truetion so given is supported by line of unirorm decisions, and where it has been
acquiesced in by LegIslature for succession of years.
[6] Id.-Certainty.-Reasonable certainty, in view of conditions,
is all that is required of a statute, and liberal effect is to be
given to legislative intent when possible.
[7] Id.-Certainty.-A statute will not be declared void as beill~
indefinite if it contains a reasonably adl'<]uate disclosun> or
legislative intent regarding evil to be COlli hatted in language
giving fair noticE' of practices to be avoi,lE'd.
[8] Id.-Construction-Effect of Construction.-Constructillll of
statute by .iudi<>illl decision hE'COllH'S a part of it, and stand:! I'd
thus estahli!<hcd may he sufficiE'llt to satisfy refluil'(,lllent or dill'
process of law that onp be given adequate warning of OtIl'll~l'
with which he lOay be charged.

APPEAL from an oraer of the Superior Court of Ln<;
Angeles County grantillg motioll to set asille un iuJiclllleut.
William B. Neeley, .Judge. Ueversed.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. .'amp~.
Deputy Attorney General, S. Erne~t Holi. Dist!·j(·t AttOI'lIt'~'
(Los Angeles), .Jere J, Sullivan and Simon L. Huse, Deputy
District Attorneys, for Appellant.
Bodkin, Breslin & Luddy, Henry G. Bodkin, Georg!' :'11.
Breslin, Michael G. Luddy and Peter E. Giauuilli for Re·
spondent.
ED~lONDS, .J.-Hf'rbprt HaHner was chflrged in threl'
counts of an indictment with huying offereu bribes to (,t'rtaill
officers of the city of Los AII.!rele" in violation of sectiol1 6;
of the Penal Code. I The People have appealed from all
~ 8 et setl.; Am.Jur .. Bdht'ry. ~ 1:\
Every person who gi,-c. or offers any hribe to any executive 'Jliicel
of this ~tate. with intent to influ('n('(' him in respect to ally :lct, ,Ic'l'i"ioll
vote, opinion, or other procc(><lillg as snch officer is punishn hie hy ll11rri.
onment in the ~tate prison not I('~~ than on(' nor mOT(' thlln fourteen
Tears, and is disqualified from holdmg any office in this state."

[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Bribery,
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urder granting HaHner's motion to set the indictment aside.
Th(' named nffil'crs w~r<' th~ pr(,f'ir1<'nt of the board of police
commi~siollcrs, the citJ attorney and the executive assistant
city attorney. It was alleged that HaHner ottered the bribes
with intent to influence the officials in their" acts, decisions,
votes, opinions and proceedings" with respect to certain
pending applications for permits to "conduct games of skill
and science business" within the city. As mated by the trial
judge in his memorandum opinion, the order was based upon
the conclusion that "executh'e officers of the City of Los
Angeles are not executive officers of this state as defined in
section 67 of the Penal Code."
It is undisputed that the evidence presented to the grand
jury establishes reasonable and probable cause to believe that
the city officials were executive officers and that HaHner
offered bribes to them to influence their official determinations.
[1] The sole question is whether the term "executive officer
of this state," as used in section 67, includes an executive
officer of a city.
The People rely upon prior decisions of the District Court
of Appeal construing the phrase "of this state" as being
the equivalent of "in this state." As HalIner reads the
statute, it applies only to an otter of a bribe made to an
officer of the State of California.
In 1883, this court in dictum said that section 67 was aU
inclusive. "The sixty-seventh section of the Penal Code
provides that any person who gives or offers a bribe to any
executive officer, with intent to· influence him in respect to
any act, etc., as such officer is punishable. By the flixtyseventh section the ottense defined is that of one who offers;
by the sixty-eighth, that of one who receives a bribe." (PeopZe
v. Markham, 64 Oal. 157, 162 [30 P. 620,49 Am.Rep. 700].)
Many years later, one Singh, who had been charged with
offering and giving a bribe to a district attorney, applied to
the District Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibiti(,n to
stay all proceedings upon the indictment. In denying Singh
relief, the court referred to section 343 of the Political Code,
as tbpn in effect (see Gov. Code, § 1001) which classified
the district attorney as "a civil executive officer." It also
said: .. [T] here is no other section in the Penal Code which
makes it a crime to give or offer a bribe to an executive officer,
either county or state, for the purpose of corruptly influencing
his official action than section 67, and we shan not commit
ourselves to the belief ••• that the legislatllre has either
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intentionally or inaovl'rtently omitted to pas.~ It. Is\v Rllt.hor
izing t.h{' pnnishment of a person for corrupting or EltteU1ptin~
to corrupt a county executive offic<'r." (8inghv. ,Q'1perinr
Court, 44 Cal.App. 64, 67 [185 P. 985].)
HaHner argues that, after the court determined the status
of the district attorney, further discussion of the questionR
presented constitutes dictum. But tbe holding that section ~7
includes any executive officer "in the state" was expressly
made the ground of decision. At the least, it· was an alter.
native one. Dictum in Gayer v. Whelan, 60 Cal.App.2d 616. 619
[141 P.2d 514], supports this analysis of the Singh opinion.
"[It] did not directly bold that the district attorney was a
state officer, but held in view of the fact that the Legislature did
not make any provision relating to the bribing of an executive
county officer, as distinguished from an executive state officer.
the term executive officer of the state was all inclusive."
HaUner next contends that if the Singh case is more thaD
dictum; it should be overruled. He argues that section 67 is
not ambiguous, hence not subject to interpretation. [2a] But
the word "of" has different meanings. It may be used in its
possessive sense or to indicate geographic location. .. Land
of the state" means "land within the state." (Sisson v.
Board 01 Supervisors 01 Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442
[104 N.W. 454, 70 L.R.A. 440].) "City Court of Macon"
means the city court should be located in Macon. (lvey v.
State, 112 Ga. 175 [37 S.E. 398].) "Highways of Baltimore
city" is not descriptive of or relating to title or ownership, but
refers to location and municipal jurisdiction. (Patapsco Electnc Co. v. City 01 Baltimore, 110 Md. 306 [72 A. 1039, 1041 J.)
"Courts of the state" means" courts in the state." «(hegory
v. City 01 Memphis, 157 Tenn. 68 [6 S.W.2d 332].) "Of 8
city" was used in a geographic sense, not in a possessive ont!
(.Avant v. OuacJr.ita Parish School Board, 215 La. 990 [41
So.2d 854].)
At the time the Singh case was decided, sectioD 68 of
the Penal Code, enacted at the same time as the pr~ding
section, declared it to be unlawful for any "executive offiCt>r
or person elected or appointed to an executive office" to
accept a bribe. By the judicial construction of section 67.
that enactment and sectioD 68, as then in effect, were com
piementary statutes insofar as they concerned executive
officers. Each of these statutes made the defined crime a
felony and prescribed punishment of imprisonment for from
one to 14 years with the additional penalty of disqualificatioD
from holding any office in this state.
·~I
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In 1929, by the enactment of section 67% of the Penal
Code, the Legislature made it unlawful for any person to
give or offer any bribe "to any ministerial officer, employee,
or appointee of the State of California, county or city therein
or political subdivision thereof." One who violated the statute
was guilty of a misdemeanor. In 1939, the punishment was
increased by providing that, if the theft of the thing given
or offered as a bribe would be grand theft, the offense is
a felony.
Section 68 was enlarged by the Legislature of 1933 to
make it unlawful for any "executive or ministerial officer,
employee or appointee of the State of California, county or
city therein, or political subdivision thereof," to ask for, agree
to receive, or receive a bribe. The amendment made no
change in the prescribed punishment.
It is significant that since the decision in the Singh case,
although the Legislature has considered the subject of bribery
of public officers and made a number of statutory changes,
it has not amended section 67. [3] Where a statute has
been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is
uot altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed
that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction
and approves of it. (Slocum v. Bear Valley Irr. Co., 122
Cal. 555, 556 [55 P. 403, 68 Am.St.Rep. 68]; People v.
Southern Pac. Co., 209 Cal. 578, 595 [290 P. 25].)
[4] The legislative intent should be ascertained not alone
,. from the literal meaning of the words of the statute but upon.
a consideration of all of the law relating to the same subject i
· matter. (Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Ca1.2d
797, 805 [249 P.2d 241]; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie,·
19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [122 P.2d 526] j People v. Roland, 134
• Cal.App. 675, 683 [26 P.2d 517].) [2b] The statutes now in
1effect, in conjunction with the interpretation given section 67
'in the Singh case, present a consistent pattern for the punish-'
:.ment of a person giving or offering to give a bribe to a public
•officer, or one who, as a public officer, asks for or receives a
bribe. The offeror of a bribe to Rn executive officer in the
state is guilty of a felony and is disqualified from holding
public office. (§ 67.) Any such officer who asks for or
receives such a bribe is subject to the same penalty. (§ 68.)
,It is also a crime to give or offer a bribe to any ministerial
· officer, the penalty being dependent upon the value of the
bribe. (§ 67%. ) The ministerial officer who asks for or
inceives such a bribe is guilty of a felony, regardless of the
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amouut of the bribe. (§ 68.) Giving or offering a bribe to
a judicial officer is punishable as a felouy. (§ 92.) It is
also a felony for a judicial officer to ask for or to receive a
bribe. (§ 93.) A person who gives, or offers, a bribe to a
member of any legislative body of the state or of its political
subdivisions, or a member of any such body who asks for
or receives a bribe, is guilty of a felony. ( § § 85, 86, 165.)
There are no overlapping statutes and no omissions if section
67 is applicable to any executive officer in the state.
Since the decision in the Singh case, five convictions for
violation of section 67, or for conspiracy to violate it, have
been upheld although the person bribed was not a state officer.
(People v. Jackson, 42 Cal.2d !'i40 r268 P.2d 6J [policeman);
Peuple v. Mathews, 124 Cal.App.2d 67 [268 P.2d 29] [policeman]; People v. Griffin. !18 Cal.App.2d 1 [219 P.2d 519]
[sheriff) ; People v. Keyes. 103 Ca1.App. 624 [284 P. 10961
[district attorney).) In each of the last four cases a petition
for hearing in this court was denied. Only in the Mathews
case was the meaning of the statute challenged and the court
followed the Singh decision. [5] "After the enactment of
a statute, when a construction has been placed upon it bv
the highest court of the state. it will be steadily adhered t~
in subsequent cases, unless very plainly shown to have been
wrong, and more especially where the construction so given
is supported by a line of uniform decisions. and where it
has been acquiesced in by the legislature for a succession of
years. In that case, the construction becomes as much a part
of the statute as if it had been written into it originally."
(Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 2d ed.,
1911, § 93, p. 298; see also Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal.
201, 208 [58 P. 460J.)
HaUner contends that to construe section 67 as applicable
to any executive officer in the state makes the statute so
uncertain as to give him inadequate notice of the offense of
which he might be charged and thus deny him due prOCeR'I
of law. [6] However," [r)f'asonable certainty, in view of
the conditions, is all that is required, and liberal C'fi'ect is
always to be given to the legislative intent when possible."
(Pf't;ple v. Kennedy, 2] Cal.App.2d 18!), 193 [69 P.2d 2~4].)
[7] A statute will not be <1rl'Jared void aR bein~ indefinitf'
if it ('onfains "a reasonably a(1rqnate dis('losnre of the le!!is.
Jatiye il!tent regarding an evil to be combatted in langtUlf!"f'
{!iving fair nl)tiee of the practicC'fI to be Ryoidrd." (People v.
Deibert, 117 Cal.App.2d 410, 418 [256 P.2d 355].) As
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declared by the United States Supreme Court in a comparable
situation, "[t1he canon in favor of strict constrnetion is
not an inexorable command to override common sense and
evidcnt statutory purpose. It does not require magll ified
emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it
a mcaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole
remaining language." (United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18,
25 [68 8.Ct. 376. 92 L.Ed. 442]; see also Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. ]24, 128 [56 8.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522] ; Kordel
v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 [69 S.Ct. 106. 93 T.J.Ed 52] ;
Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337. 340 [72
S.Ct. 329, 96 hEd. 367].)
[8] Furthermore, even if prior to the judicial decisions
construing it section 67 might have been subject to attack
upon the ground of uncertainty, such an objection no longer
is tenable. The construction of a statute by judicial decision
becomes a part of it, and the standard thus established may
be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of due process of
law that one be given adequate warning of an offense with
which he may be charged. (See Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 456 [59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888] : Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 [68 8.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840].)
Since the Singh decision, one who gives or offers a bribe to
an executive officer in this state is given ample notice that
he is committing a felony.
The order is reversed.
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-Thc majority opinion interprets the phrase
"executive officer of this state" to mean, not what it says.
but "executive officer in this state," and therefore to include
an executive officer of a freeholder-charter city despite thp
settled law that an executive officer of such a city is not an
executive officer of the state. (Civic Center Assn. v. Rat1road
Com., 175 Cal. 441. 448 [166 P. 351]; Fleming v. Hance,
153 Cal. 162, 169 [94 P. 620] ; Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal
456.462 [56 P. 53] ; Otis v. City of Lo.~ Angeles. 52 Cal.App.2d
605, 611-612 [126 P.2d 954]; Const., art. XI, §§ 6, 8,
8%; art. XX, § 16.) It is urged that "of" was not used
in a possessive sens!' but in a geographic sense to mean "in"
or "within," even though according to standard dictionaries
of the English language, "of" is not the ('(l'livalcnt of "in"
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or "within." (Webster's New Intern at. Diet., p. 1689
[2d ed., 1948, unabridged]; I"uuk and Wagnalls' New
Rtaudard Diet., p. 1712 [193:3].)
The very language
of section 67 itself, which includes both "of" and "in,"
dl'monstrates that the Legislature did not regard "of" as
the equivalent of "in," and that when it used "of" it meant
"of" and when it used "in" it meant "in": "Every person
who . . . offers any bribe to any executive officer of this state
. . . is punishable by imprisonment . . . and is disqualified
from holding auy office in this state." (Italics added.)
There is no substance to the court's argument in Singh v.
Superior Oourt, 44 Cal.App. 64, 68 [185 P. 985], on which
the majority opinion relies, that "if the legislature had in·
tended to limit the application of section 67 to state officel'8.
it would have been a very easy matter for it to have given
apt and unambiguous expression of such intention. It would
have undoubtedly said if such had been its purpose, 'any
state executive officer,' in place of 'any executive officer of
the state.''' There is no more difference in the meaning
of these phrases than there is in the phrases "any Supreme
Court opinion" and "any opinion of the Supreme Court."
Each phrase has exactly the same meaning; neither is more
"apt and unambiguous" than the other.
That the Legislature did not mean "in" when it used "of"
is also made clear by the language of former section 74a of
the Penal Code,! which was added in 1905 to the same title
of the code in which section 67 appears (Stats. 1905, p. 646),
14 years before the decision in the Singh case. In that section
the phrase "every officer of this state" was set off from the
phrase "or of any county, city and county, city. or township
therein," thus demonstrating that "officer of this state"
meant an officer of the state as distinguishe<l from an officer
"of any county, city and county, city, or township therein."
But, according to the majority opinion herein, it was an idle
act to separate these phrases, and despite an established rule
of construction (Oounty of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Ca1.2d
634, 641-642 [122 P.2d 526]), we must regard the latter
phrase as superfluons. Usages similar to those in section 74a
1§ 74a. "Every officer of this state, or of any county, city and county,
city, or towuship therein, who accepts, keeps, retains or diverts tor hie
own use or for t!IO !I"" of any other person any part of the salary or fees
allowed by law to his deputy, ('lerk, or othE'r subordinate officer, i8
guilty of a felony."
(Ita lira IIdllc(l.) This section was transfelTed to
section 1]9:) of the Government Colle in 1943, the language being changed
to conform to the usage in that colle.
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roull<l ill ;;\',-f iOIl!' {)7lj:.:.2 fi~.3 alld 70' or I h,' i "'11101
Code. Thpse sf'(~tio"!1 "Is... If'flfl 11](' to nelil've thai III<' I",;.!·is.
laturr did not meal! "ill" whl'n it IlS(,O "of." Siller thi,:
court, however, now hoi os that" of" means "in," the phrast'
"officer, employee or appointee of . . . [any] county or
city therein or political subdivision thereof," whi('h appears
in each of these sections, has also become superfluous.
Even jf we believed, as the court apparently did in the
Singh case (44 Cal.App. 64, 67-68). that at the time of the
enactment of section 67 the Legislature inadvertently omitted
to provide for the giving or offering of a bribe to an executive officer of a freeholder-charter city, we cannot create an
offense that the Legislature failed to create. We must assume
that the Legislature meant the section to be read as It was
written, however unwise we may think the Legislature was
in not creating an offense that we may think should have
been created. We ('an not create such an offense by enlat'ging
the statute, or by inserting or deleting words, nor should we
do so by giving a false meaning to its words. (Pen. Code § 7,
subd. 16; Code Civ. Proc., § 1858: People v. Knowles, 35
Cal. 2d 175,182-183 [217 P.2d 1] ; Seaboard Acceptance Corp,
v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 365-366 [5 P.2d 8821 ; City of Eureka
v. Diaz. 89 Cal. 467, 469 [26 P. 961]; Gayer v. Whelan, 59
Cal.App.2d 255, 262-263 [138 P.2d 763]; People v. Pacific
Guano Co .• 55 Cal.App.2d 845, 848-849 [132 P.2d 254].) Such
a practice makes it impossiJ:>le for anyone to rely on the written word of the Legislature and only adds confusion to the
I.'au be

)

"§ 67¥o!. •• Every person who gives or offers as a bribe to any mini&terial officer. employee, or appointee of the State of California, county
or city therein or political suhdivision tliereof, any thing the theft of
which would be petty theft is guilty of a misdemeanor; if the theft
of the thing so given or offered would m- grand theft the off!'nse i.
a felony." (Italics added.)
"§ 68. ., Every executive or ministerial officer, employee or appointee
of the State of California, county or city therein or political subdivision
thereOf, who asks, receives, or agrees to receive, any briBe, upon any
agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, or action upon any
matter then pending, or which may be brought before him in his official
capacity, shall be influenced thereby, is punishable by imprisonment in
the State prison not less than one nor more than fourteen years: and,
in addition thereto, forfeits his office, and is forever disqualified from
(Italics added.)
holding any office in this State."
• § 70. ., Every executive or ministerial officer, employee or appointee
of the State of California, county or city therein or political subdivision
thereof, who knowingly asks, receives or agrees to receive any emolu·
ment, gratuity or reward, or any promise thereof ex(?epting such as may
be authorized by law for doin, an official act, is guilty of a mia
demeanor."
(Italies added.)
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nlrrady dim!'nlt t.ask of drafting statutes. 'rhlls, hf'rraft<'f
t.hl' rlegislat.llfe mUll!. ponder the po:-;.o;ibility that "M" will IJP
construed to mean .. in" alld that other common words l11ay
also be givl'll a distorted meaning. The harm attending the
delay in legislative correction of its own omissions or its
failure completely to attack an evil is outweighed by the confusion created by judicial correction of such lapses under the
guise of statutory construction.
Nor is there any substance to the argument that the Legislature's failure to amend section 67 after the decision in the
Singh case constitutes a legislative approval of the Interpretation of the section in that case. As the Supreme Court
of the United States said in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119 [60 S.Ct. 4·14, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368]
[involving a previous interpretation by that court of § 302(c)
of the Revenue Act of 1926], "it would require very per.
suasive circumstances enveloping congressional silence to debar this court from re-examining its own doctrines." In
the present case not even the reexamination of this court's
own doctrines is involved. Not only has section 67 never been
previously construed by this court!! but, in the words quoted
in the majority opinion from Blaek on The Construction and
Interpretation of the Laws, the construction of that section
in the Singh case is "very plainly shown to have been wrong."
The doctrine that legislative silence constitutes approval
of judicial construction "must be derived by a form of
negative inference, a process lending itself to much guesswork. . . . There are vast differences between legislating by
doing nothing and legislating by positive enactment, both in
the processes by which the will of Congress is derived antI
stated and in the elarity and eertainty of the expression of its
will. And there are many reasons, other than to indieate approval of what the courts have done, why Congress may fail
to take affirmative aetion to repudiate their miseonstruction
of its duly adopted laws. Among them may be sheer pressure
of other and more important business. See Moore v. Cleveland Ry. 00.,6 Cir., 108 F.2d 656, 660. At times politieal consit.lerations may work to forbid taking corrective action. And
-This court's denial of a hearing does not commit it to the proposition~
of law laid down in an opinion of a District Court of Appeal. (Western
L. Co. v. Slate BOIJrd of Equalization, 11 Cal.2d 156, 167·168 [78 P.2<1
731, 111 A.L.R. 838]; Shelton v. City of LOB Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 550
L27.; P. 421]: People v. Rabe, 202 Cnl. 409, 418·419 [261 P. 303]: 1ft
rtl Stevens, 197 Cal. 408, 423·424 [241 P. 881: Bohn v. Bohn, 164 Cal.
532,537·538 [129 P. 981]; People v. Davis, 147 Cal. 346,350 [81 P. 71S1.)
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in such eases, as well as others, there may be a strong a:ld
proper tendency to trust to the courts to correct thci r 0\\,11
errors, see Girouard v. United States, supra [328 tT.S. 69J, as
they ought to do when experience has confirmed or demollstrated the errors' existenee . . . . More often than not the
only safe assumption to make from Congress' inaction is
simply that Congress did not intend to act at all. Cf. United
States v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 U.S. 534. 550 [60 S.
Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345J. At best the contrary view can only
be an inference, altogether lacking in the normal evidence of
legislative intent and often subject to varying views of that
intent. In short, although recognizing that by silence Congress at times may be taken to acquiesce and thus approve,
we should be very sure that, under all the circumstances of a
given situation, it has done so before we rule and thus at
once relieve onrselves from and shift to it the burden of COl'recting what we have done wrongly . . . . Just as dubious
legislative history is at times much overridden, so also is
silence or inaction often mistaken for legislation." (Mr.
Justice Rutledge, concurring in Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14,23-24 [67 S.Ct. 13,91 L.Ed 12J.) In my opinion
silence or inaction is mistaken here for legislation. The words
"of" and "in" remain in section 67. They mean now what
they meant when the section was enacted, and their insistent
presence belies the notion that by silence and inaction the
Legislature has changed their meaning.
If, despite its plain wording, section 67 includes officers of
a freeholder-charter city, it will, when read with section 77 6 ,
overlap section 67%. Thus, one who offers as a bribe a thing,
the theft of which would be petty theft, to an administrative
or ministerial officer of a freeholder-charter city will be punishable either as a misdemeanant under section 67% (imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or a
fine not exceeding $500, or both) or as a felon under section
67 (imprisonment in the state prison for one to fourteen
years and disqualification from ever holding any public office) in the discretion of the grand jury or district attorney
that returns the indictment or information against him. Sneh
a result subverts the l<,gislative purpose of providing a lesser
penalty for thc less heinoll!'; offen!!e.
'§ 77. "The various provisions of this chnpter nppJy to administratin
and ministerial officel's, in the same manner as if they were mentioned
therein.' ,
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Sillcc thcrc was no evidence before the grand jury eith'~r
that the persons to whom defendant allegedly uffered t lip
bribps were "rxeeuti\'e uffi<~l'rs of this state" or that the bribt'~
we!'!' allegedly offered with intent to influenee their actions in
any capacity as sueh offieers (Greenberg v. Superior Cow·t.
19 CaL2d 319, 321-322 [121 P.2d 713] ; Pen. Code, § 995), I
would affirm the judgment.
Carter, J., concurred.

